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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper tests the hypothesis that democracies exhibit stronger environmental commitment than 
non-democracies using a variety of econometric techniques (single equation and three-stage least 
squares estimations). A number of proxy variables are used in lieu of environmental commitment, a 
non-observable variable. Strong evidence is found that democracies sign and ratify more multilateral 
environmental agreements, participate in more environmental intergovernmental organizations, 
comply better with reporting requirements under the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora, put a greater percentage of their land area under 
protections status, are more likely to have a National Council on Sustainable Development in their 
country and have more environmentally relevant information available than non-democracies. The 
results are robust with respect to employing a simultaneous equation model in which instrumental 
variables are used for democracy and income to check for potential omitted variable bias. With a 
smaller and somewhat biased sample, due to lack of income inequality data for many non-
democratic countries, we found that democracy still has a positive effect on environmental 
commitment in some cases. Income inequality has a negative indirect effect on environmental 
commitment due to its detrimental effect on democracy. Sometimes income inequality is also 
estimated to have a direct effect, but the direction of this effect is inconsistent across our range of 
proxy variables of environmental commitment. We report the results based on the use of one index 
of democracy, but we find robustness across four indices of democracy. Decomposing the 
institutional components of democracy, we find that participation, rather than executive constraints or 
patterns of executive recruitment, plays the major role with regard to environmental commitment. 
Conflict (interstate and intrastate – both large and small) was not related to environmental 
commitment. 
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1. Introduction 
Is democracy good or bad for the environment? This is a complex question without a clear cut 
answer. As Desai (1998a: 301) concedes: ‘whether democracies are more likely to be 
environmentally friendly is not entirely clear’. Indeed, there is only weak statistical evidence in favor 
of democracy promoting environmental outcomes. Do democracies show stronger environmental 
commitment than non-democracies? This question refers only to a subset of the democracy and 
environment problem area, but it has the advantage that it has a clear affirmative answer, as the 
empirical analysis in this paper will show. 
After presenting some theoretical considerations on the democracy and environment relationship 
and reviewing the relevant empirical literature, the case for focusing on environmental commitment is 
put forward. The hypothesis that democracies exhibit stronger environmental commitment is 
empirically tested and strongly confirmed by the analysis. Much of our analysis regards international 
environmental commitment. Our results are robust across a variety of model specifications, different 
measures of democracy, and over a wide range of proxies for environmental commitment. 
Of course, it would have been desirable to analyze more comprehensively domestic 
environmental commitment as well; however, due to a lack of comparable cross-sectional data, only 
three of the variables used in the empirical analysis of this paper can be interpreted as proxies for 
domestic environmental commitment -- namely, the percentage of land area under protection status, 
the presence of a National Council on Sustainable Development and the availability of 
environmentally relevant information. 
Section 2 discusses important theoretical considerations concerning the democracy and 
environment relationship. Section 3 reviews and critiques the existing empirical literature. Much of 
this literature looks at environmental outcomes rather than environmental commitment and in section 
4 we make the case for focusing on environmental commitment instead. In section 5 we introduce 
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four measures of democracy. The dependent variables and the hypotheses to be tested are 
described in section 6, the independent variables in section 7. Section 8 presents and discusses the 
results of our analysis. 
 
 
2. Democracy and Environment: Theoretical Considerations 
Payne (1995) has provided what amounts to probably the most comprehensive theoretical treatise in 
favor of a positive impact of democracy on the environment. The gist of his argument is that in 
democracies citizens are better informed about environmental problems (freedom of press) and can 
better express their environmental concerns and demands (freedom of speech), which will facilitate 
an organization of environmental interests (freedom of association), which will in turn put pressure on 
policy entrepreneurs operating in a competitive political system to respond positively to these 
demands (freedom of vote), both domestically as well as via international cooperation. In non-
democratic systems, on the other hand, governments are likely to restrict the access of their 
population to information, restrict the voicing of concerns and demands, restrict the organization of 
interests and isolate themselves from the citizens’ preferences. In other words, in democracies if 
citizens are concerned about environmental problems this will eventually require policy makers to 
exhibit stronger environmental commitment to address these concerns and honor the demand for 
environmental protection measures. 
The same cannot be said of non-democracies, for which Chadwick (1995: 575) argues that 
‘environmental signals and concerns which conflict with state development plans may be silenced, 
and state managers may even fool themselves into thinking such concerns do not exist’. He further 
suggests that non-democracies tend to de-sensitize themselves from environmental problems 
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concentrated in areas of the excluded and powerless populace, thus systematically neglecting the 
costs of environmental degradation. 
Congleton (1992) examines how the median voter in a democratic system and an authoritarian 
ruler in a non-democratic system would set environmental regulations so as to maximize their 
respective utilities. There are two relevant factors. First, Congleton assumes that a shorter time 
horizon will lead to less strict environmental regulations. This can be justified by the long-term nature 
of many environmental problems. Since authoritarian rulers tend to have a shorter time horizon for 
fear of being thrown out of office, he predicts that democracies may have stricter environmental 
regulations than non-democracies. Second, the authoritarian ruler also appropriates a larger share of 
income from the economy. The effect of this on the strictness of environmental regulations is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, a larger national income share might lead to less strict regulations given 
that such regulations are costly in terms of reducing available national income: ‘An increase in the 
fraction of national income going to the individual of interest increases the marginal cost of 
environmental standards faced by him, since he will now bear a larger fraction of associated 
reductions in national income’ (ibid: 416). On the other hand, appropriation of a larger share of the 
national income might also lead to stricter environmental standards if we assume that environmental 
quality is a normal, if not luxury, good where a higher income leads to increased demand for 
environmental quality.  
In a slightly different vein, Desai (1998b: 11) suspects that ‘as democracy is dependent on 
economic development, and since economic growth and prosperity generally result in environmental 
pollution and ecological destruction, democracy would not necessarily be protective of the 
environment’. Generally, while environmental problems directly affecting the health of a country’s 
population are likely to improve with economic growth (at least after some threshold of income has 
been achieved), pollutants that can be externalized upon the future and/or people outside a country’s 
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boundaries are likely to worsen (Neumayer, 1999; Panayotou, 2000). An example for the latter 
would be carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. In our analysis here we address this problem by explicitly 
modeling both the relationship between democracy and environmental commitment and the 
relationship between economic development and environmental commitment while accounting for 
latent variables relating to both democracy and economic wealth. 
On a final note, it has been argued by some that it might be more difficult in democracies than in 
autocracies to constrain environmentally damaging economic activities as well as population growth 
since in autocracies the government does not have to pay as much attention to its citizens rights to 
engage in such activities and their rights for procreation. It is exactly this issue that writers such as 
Hardin (1968) or Heilbronner (1974) had in mind in voicing their early concern on whether 
democracy could be relied upon to solve environmental problems. 
In conclusion, while a good theoretical case can be made for democracy having a positive 
impact on environmental performance, there are a number of considerations pointing in the opposite 
direction. The effect of democracy on the environment is therefore a complex one. It is doubtful, to 
say the least, whether this complexity is fully addressed in simply entering income as a control 
variable in empirical studies. Indeed, this is why we use a three-stage least squares estimation 
technique. 
 
 
3. Review and Critique of Existing Empirical Literature 
Both political scientists and economists have addressed the empirical links between democracy and 
environment. In accordance with the unfortunate, but quite common, disciplinary divide, the 
economists’ research efforts are not recognized by political scientists and vice versa. Congleton 
(1992) represents one of the earliest empirical contribution by economists. Ideally, in order to test his 
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theory (as described in the last section), he would need to address differences in domestic 
environmental regulation. For lack of data, he sees himself unable to do so and instead performs 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on Chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) and methane emissions as 
well as logit estimates of signature of the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, using Freedom 
House data for the democracy variable. He finds that democratic countries, after controlling for a 
range of variables, are more likely to sign the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol, but also 
have higher methane and CFC emissions. Murdoch & Sandler (1997) show, however, that while 
democracies might have higher absolute levels of CFC emissions, as indicated by Congleton (1992), 
democracy is also a marginally significant determinant of CFC emission reductions between 1986 
and 1989.2 
Both Barrett & Graddy (2000) and Torras & Boyce (1998) use the panel data, with which 
Grossman & Krueger (1995) in their famous contribution established empirical links between a 
country’s income level and its water and air pollution emissions (laying the foundation for the so-
called Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature).3 Barrett & Graddy, using Freedom House 
data and generalized least squares with a random effects estimator, find that countries with high 
political rights and civil liberties tend to have lower air and water pollution levels. Torras & Boyce, 
using the same data, come to similar findings using OLS instead. Scruggs (1998), using Freedom 
House data in OLS estimation, finds that democracy is statistically insignificant once one controls for 
income inequality in the case of dissolved oxygen, fecal coliform and particulates emissions. It 
assumes statistical significance only for the case of sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions. 
                                                 
2 Similar results for NOx and SO2 emission reductions are reported in Murdoch, Sandler &Sargent (1997). 
3 For a good overview of this literature, see Panayotou (2000). 
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The problem with these studies stems from the use of the Freedom House data in a panel 
format. The Freedom House data have been collected by an advocacy group to evaluate the state of 
democracy in the world for a given year. The scale changes over time and it is not designed as a 
series. Indeed, some cases (e.g. Mexico, Uruguay) rise and fall along the scale in association with 
global changes in the number of countries that are democratic in years in which these countries 
exhibited no institutional change. This is particularly problematic in the middle parts of the Freedom 
House scale. The Freedom House scales of civil and political rights are unsuitable for cross-temporal 
analysis, but we use it here only for cross-sectional analysis. 
In political science, Gleditsch & Sverdrup (1995/2002) run simple bivariate correlations, using 
Polity data, with a range of environmental variables. Midlarsky (1998), using Freedom House, Polity 
and a third data set based on Bollen (1993) for measuring democracy, runs multivariate OLS 
regressions with several environmental aspects as the dependent variable, such as deforestation, CO2 
emissions, soil erosion and land area protection. He finds that democratic countries tend to have 
higher deforestation rates, higher CO2 emissions, possibly higher soil erosion, but also protect a 
higher percentage of their land area. Contrary to Midlarsky (1998), Didia (1997) finds that 
democracies have lower deforestation rates, but only simple bivariate regression analysis is 
employed. 
All these empirical studies suffer from a number of weaknesses. No comprehensive critique is 
attempted here, rather we concentrate on the aspects most relevant to this study. Congleton (1992) 
based his analysis on data from 1988. Were he to repeat his analysis with data from 2001, his 
attempt to arrive at significant results would be frustrated by the fact that both the Vienna Convention 
and the Montreal Protocol have achieved almost universal coverage in the meantime. What he would 
need to do then is to look at whether democracies have signed or ratified these agreements earlier in 
time than non-democracies. Studies using a proportional hazards model have found that 
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democracies, as measured by Freedom House data, are more likely than non-democracies to have 
ratified early the United Nations Framework Climate Change Convention (Fredriksson & Gaston, 
2000) as well as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (Neumayer, 2002b). 
Even more troublesome, Congleton’s original sample is likely to have been biased. This is 
because at the early stages of multilateral action on ozone layer depletion, it was very much a 
developed country concern as well as a phenomenon largely caused by developed country 
emissions. While some developing countries were pro-active from the beginning, most waited to see 
what developed countries were willing to offer them for curtailing their future growth in consumption 
of ozone depleting substances (Benedick, 1998). Consequently, in 1988 out of the 28 signatory or 
contracting parties to the Vienna Convention 19 were developed countries, that is member countries 
of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). So were 18 of the 29 
parties to the Montreal Protocol. Because all OECD countries are democracies, this leads to biased 
estimates. 
Barrett & Graddy (2000) group countries into low, medium and high civil and political freedom, 
using dummy variables, as well as entering civil and political freedoms as continuous variables in 
separate regressions. A closer look at their results reveals that the study provides only limited 
evidence for a positive impact of freedom on the environment. First, some of the variables have signs 
contrary to expectation. Secondly, practically none of the dummy or continuous variables are 
statistically significant on their own in spite of the quite high number of observations4, which all other 
things equal boosts significance. It is only in their combination that these variables gain some 
statistical significance in all air pollution regressions. For the water pollution regressions even the 
combined explanatory power of the freedom variables is statistically insignificant in the majority of 
                                                 
4 In many cases greater than 1000. 
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cases. Thirdly, as noted, the Freedom House democracy data are inappropriate for panel analysis. 
Thus, Barrett & Graddy (2000) provide at best some statistical evidence for a negative link between 
freedom and air and water pollution. 
Torras & Boyce (1998) enter freedom only as a continuous variable and estimate separate 
coefficients for countries above and below $5000 per capita income in purchasing power parity. Out 
of 14 regressions, the freedom coefficient has an unexpected sign on six different occasions, 
particularly prevalent in the subset of high income countries, and is statistically insignificant in a further 
three cases. Another weakness of the study is that in spite of using panel data, no time-series for the 
freedom variable is constructed. Instead the freedom variable is set equal to the 1995 value 
throughout. While Freedom House measures are not designed for use in a panel, this is no solution. 
The empirical evidence resulting from their study is therefore not particularly strong either. 
Unfortunately, the two studies are not directly comparable with each other since differing statistical 
techniques are used and Torras & Boyce (1998) also control for income inequality and literacy. 
 
 
4. The Case for Focusing on Environmental Commitment 
The more general problem with much of the empirical literature is that it focuses too much on 
environmental outcomes instead of looking at environmental commitment. Take Midlarsky’s (1998) 
examination of CO2 emissions and soil degradation as an example. It suffers from the same kind of 
problem as Torras & Boyce (1998) and Barrett & Graddy (2000), which similarly concentrate on 
environmental outcomes. Why would we expect democracies to have more or less severe soil 
degradation? Soil degradation depends on a plethora of factors including natural ones, many of 
which we are unable to control for in a statistical analysis. No wonder then that no robust statistical 
relationship can be established. We would expect democratic countries to engage more in an 
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international agreement addressing soil erosion, if there was one. We would also expect democratic 
countries to engage more in activities stemming the spread of soil erosion. But we would not 
necessarily expect them to have less soil degradation, at least not until many years have passed and 
the prevention activities referred to above have had time to make an impact. Similarly, there are 
good reasons why we cannot expect democracies to have lower CO2 emissions. This problem can 
be externalized upon the future and people outside a country’s boundaries. The volume of CO2 
emissions is also strongly influenced by economic growth and the historic mix of primary energy 
types in use. Both are difficult for policy makers to control. Finally, this is a relatively new problem 
and one that it is not fully recognized by all democratic governments. Midlarsky (1998) finds a strong 
statistically significant relationship with only one of his democracy variables (Polity). Even this result is 
most likely an artifact of functional misspecification, however. As simple a transformation as including 
squared and cubic GDP per capita in the estimation (a standard procedure in the relevant EKC 
literature), renders democracy insignificant.5 Again, we would expect democracies to more actively 
engage in a MEA addressing global warming such as the Kyoto Protocol and further below we will 
see that they actually do. But only years or decades later will this translate into a statistically 
significant relationship with CO2 emissions (with respect to growth rates of emissions rather than to 
absolute levels, as modeled by Midlarsky, 1998). 
Hence, at best there is to be expected only a weak link between democracy and (some) 
environmental outcomes. This is the ultimate reason, we would submit, why studies examining the 
impact of democracy on environmental outcomes in general provide only weak statistical evidence.6 
                                                 
5 The results are available from the first author upon request. 
6 The rather ambiguous evidence with respect to the impact of democracy and democratisation on environmental 
outcomes is not confined to quantitative studies, but can also be found in case studies. See, for example, Potter 
(1996), Earnhart (1997), Tang &Tang (1999), Walker (1999). 
13 
Interestingly, the outcome variables for which Torras & Boyce (1998) find the strongest evidence for 
a significant relationship with democracy are smoke emissions and fecal coliform effluents – two 
variables that do not suffer from severe time lags between commitment and outcome, that are well 
within the control of policy makers, that strongly affect the health of citizens and success is easily 
monitored by the electorate. Similarly, the only dependent environmental outcome variable for which 
Midlarsky (1998) finds a relatively significant relationship with democracy, namely deforestation, is 
also the one, where he can put forward a relatively plausible theoretical argument establishing such a 
link. 
A much stronger theoretical argument can be made for a positive relationship between 
democracy and environmental commitment. In democracies people can express their environmental 
preferences better, these preferences will be honored or addressed better by policy makers and this 
should translate into stronger revealed environmental commitment. But it need not translate into 
better environmental outcomes. The link between democracy and environmental outcomes is likely to 
be weaker the more factors outside a government’s control impact upon outcomes, the longer the 
time span between environmental commitment and its effect on environmental outcomes is and the 
more difficult environmental outcomes are to monitor. If these conditions hold true, then the 
electorate in a democracy will appreciate the difficulty of holding governments accountable for 
environmental outcomes rather than commitment and will look for commitment instead. 
What needs to be done therefore is to re-adjust the focus away from environmental outcomes 
and towards environmental commitment. Congleton (1992) in principle addresses environmental 
commitment, but his analysis has serious weaknesses as seen above. In one of his variables, namely 
protected land area (a variable included in this study as well), Midlarsky (1998) himself looks at 
environmental commitment rather than outcomes. So do Gleditsch & Sverdrup (1995/2002) in some 
of their variables, but simple bivariate analysis is often misleading and sensitive to the inclusion of 
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control variables. In some sense therefore this work builds upon and extends these earlier attempts. 
It tries to provide a comprehensive and robust empirical analysis of the impact of democracy on 
environmental commitment. 
 
 
5. Measures of Democracy 
Critical to understanding the impact of democracy on environmental commitments, is determining 
what constitutes democracy. A number of indices of democracy have been developed, drawing on 
different theories of democracy and measured in a variety of ways.7 In general, we analyze the 
relationship between democracy and environmental commitment using four different indices of 
democracy, including: 
· A combined index of democracy and autocracy based on the Polity project (Gurr & Jaggers 
2000). 
· A combined index of political rights and civil liberties based on Freedom House (2000) data. 
· Vanhanen’s (2000) index of democracy based on the Polyarchy dataset. 
· A governance indicator named ‘voice and accountability’, developed by World Bank staff 
(Kaufman et al. 1999a, 1999b). 
As expected, there is positive correlation among the various measures of democracy, but it is 
less than perfect (see table 1).8 Each measure is based on a somewhat different conception of what 
constitutes democracy. We have run our analysis on each of these indices, but due to space 
                                                 
7 For a recent overview comparing various democracy measures, see the special issue of Comparative Political 
Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, February 2002. 
8 The signs of the correlation coefficients with the freedom variable have been reversed since higher scores in the 
Freedom House data mean lower freedom. 
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limitations, we only report the results using the Polity index. This index is based on theories of 
institutions and authority developed by Gurr (1974) and Eckstein (1973). More specifically, the 
Polity data are based on expert judgement on aspects of institutionalized democracy and autocracy 
within a country, both measured on an additive 0 to 10 scale (Jaggers & Gurr, 1995). A political 
system is thus categorized on the basis of the competitiveness of political participation, the 
competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, as well as the constraints on the chief 
executive. The first concerns the regulation of executive recruitment, and is based on three 
indicators: “Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment,” “Competitiveness of Executive 
Recruitment,” and “Openness of Executive Recruitment.” The second dimension characterizes the 
constraints on the executive and is based on the single indicator “Decision Constraints on the Chief 
Executive.” Basically this means a non-executive institution possessing political power. 
 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
 
We also disentangle the three authority dimensions that constitute the institutional framework of a 
polity, including executive recruitment, constraints on the executive, and political participation. 
We test these three dimensions of democracy in section 8.3 and find that political participation 
proves to be the dimension of democracy that is most often significantly related to environmental 
commitment.  
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6. The Dependent Variables and the Hypotheses to be Tested 
Of course, environmental commitment is a non-observable variable. We therefore use a range of 
variables, which are supposed to function as proxy variables. More specifically, these variables 
include: 
· The signing and ratification of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). 
· Membership in environmental intergovernmental organizations (EIOs). 
· The extent to which reporting requirements for the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (CITES) are met. 
· The percentage of a country’s land area under protection status. 
· The existence of a National Council on Sustainable Development (NCSD) in a country. 
· The availability of environmentally relevant information concerning a country. 
 
Our basic hypothesis to be tested throughout is that democratic countries are more 
environmentally committed as measured by these proxy variables than non-democratic countries.  
 
Multilateral environmental agreements and environmental intergovernmental 
organizations 
One revelation of environmental commitment is the signing and ratification of MEAs. Of the more 
than 180 or so existing MEAs only a few are suitable for our purpose here. First, many of these 
MEAs are regional rather than global. Second, we want to look at MEAs that do not have quasi-
universal membership. This is because it is exactly these MEAs where environmental commitment is 
needed on behalf of countries to join. MEAs with quasi-universal membership, on the other hand, 
are often agreements that can be joined without commitment to incurring any costly action, where 
costs could be either monetary or opportunity costs. 
17 
Having examined a great many MEAs, we decided to pick four that fulfill these criteria:9 the 
Kyoto Protocol (84 signatures as of 26 October 2001; www.unfccc.org), the Copenhagen 
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol (115 ratifications as of 8 December 2000; 
www.unep.org/ozone), the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants10 (114 signatures 
as of 31 January 2002; www.chem.unep.ch); and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (103 
signatures as of 12 September 2001; www.biodiv.org).11 These agreements cover four important 
areas of recent multilateral environmental concern, namely climate change, ozone layer depletion, 
hazardous chemicals and pesticides, and danger to biodiversity posed by genetically modified 
                                                 
9 We also tested the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (130 contracting parties as of 1 Feburary 2002; 
www.ramsar.org). Due to space constraints we decided not to include this MEA in the reporting below, but 
results were similar to the other MEAs looked at here. 
10 Neumayer (2002a) originally included the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) Procedure 
for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade. However, we found the Stockholm 
Convention to be the more ambitious MEA in the field of hazardous chemicals and pesticides. The Rotterdam 
Convention is mainly about notification procedures in international trade of these substances, whereas the 
Stockholm Convention actually bans the production, consumption and trade of a range of persistent organic 
pollutants. 
11 Some of these agreements have been concluded so recently that either no ratifications exist yet or there are so 
few that we needed to look at signatures instead of ratifications. This is somewhat unfortunate as a country is 
only bound to an agreement and therefore formally committed once it has ratified the agreement. Experience 
shows, however, that countries often feel bound by their signature, even if they have never ratified the agreement 
for whatever reason. The prime example for this type of behaviour is the United States, with the possible 
exception of the Kyoto Protocol, where it seems that the current US government does not regard itself bound by 
the signature of its predecessor. Ratification encompasses accession, acceptance or approval of an agreement as 
well. 
18 
organisms.12 Data on the status of signature and ratification are from the homepages of the respective 
MEAs. A dummy for each MEA was created, which was set to 1 if a country had signed (or ratified 
in the case of the Copenhagen Amendment) the agreement and 0 otherwise. 
Whether a country signs a particular MEA obviously depends on a great many factors that might 
differ from one MEA to another. In looking at the four MEAs taken together, we would therefore 
hope to get a more systematic result on what factors relate to a country’s willingness to sign or ratify 
MEAs. A further variable was therefore created as the sum of the dummy variables for the MEAs, 
so that it ranges from 0 to 4 depending on how many of these MEAs a country has signed/ratified, if 
any. 
Environmentally committed countries can also be expected to participate strongly in 
environmental intergovernmental organizations (EIOs) for the same kind of reasoning that leads us to 
expect that they are more willing to sign and ratify MEAs than non-committed countries. The number 
of memberships in EIOs as of 1998 is taken from WEF (2001, annex 6), based on a codification of 
100 intergovernmental organizations as “‘environmental” and data from the Yearbook of 
International Organizations.13 This leads us to our first two hypotheses to be tested: 
 
H1: Democracies are more likely to sign or ratify MEAs than non-democracies. 
H2: Democracies participate in more EIOs than non-democracies. 
 
                                                 
12 Somewhat unfortunate is a lack of an agreement more directly addressing nature and wildlife conservation. The 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora, which would otherwise be a good 
candidate, has quasi-universal membership (152 parties as of 22 March 2000). Fortunately, however, two of our 
other proxy variables for environmental commitment are connected to nature conservation and wildlife protection. 
13 The list of organisations coded as environmental is available from the first author on request. 
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CITES reporting requirements 
Besides the signing and ratification of MEAs a good test for the extent of environmental commitment 
is a country’s compliance with the requirements of a MEA. Those requirements are usually costly to 
comply with, hence more committed countries will be more willing to incur the costs. Unfortunately, 
quantitative compliance data for a large sample of countries is usually not available. However, there 
is one MEA for which such data exist, namely the percentage of reporting requirements CITES 
parties have met.14 Data as of 1997 are from WRI (2000, table BI.4). This leads us to our third 
hypothesis: 
 
H3: Democracies meet a higher percentage of their reporting requirements under CITES than non-
democracies. 
 
Land area under protection status 
Land area under protection status is another variable concerned with more traditional nature 
conservation and wildlife protection. Data on the percentage of land area a country has put under 
protection according to any of the five management categories of the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) as of 1997 come from WRI (2000, table BI.1). We postulate as 
our fourth hypothesis: 
 
H4: Democracies put a higher percentage of their land area under protection status than non-
democracies. 
 
                                                 
14 It follows that the sample of countries comprises only those that are members of CITES. 
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Presence of a National Council on Sustainable Development 
In the wake of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, many countries started to set up a National 
Council on Sustainable Development (NCSD) (132 countries as of 9 February 2001 had such a 
council; www.ecouncil.ac.cr). A dummy was created, which was set to 1 if a country had a NCSD, 
and 0 otherwise. The objective of these councils is the promotion and implementation of sustainable 
development at the national level, thus translating Agenda 21 into national strategies. The NCSDs 
can be regarded as the domestic level counterpart to the United Nations Commission on Sustainable 
Development (UNCSD), which was established after the Earth Summit. In almost all countries the 
NCSD is set up and coordinated by some governmental agency. The existence of a NCSD can thus 
be interpreted as a sign for a country’s environmental commitment. This leads us to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H5: Democracies are more likely to have a National Council on Sustainable Development than non-
democracies. 
 
Availability of environmentally relevant information 
Lack of standardized and internationally comparable environmentally relevant information has long 
since represented a problem to researchers. While very often information collection is undertaken by 
international organizations with relatively little influence of the domestic government, we would 
nevertheless expect an environmentally committed country to actively seek provision of 
environmentally relevant information, if only for the purpose of its own domestic environmental policy 
making. This could take place either via their own data collection or via encouraging international 
organizations to undertake the research necessary for information provision in their country. 
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The World Economic Forum (WEF) has commissioned an Environmental Sustainability Index 
(ESI), which aggregates 67 variables. While not all variables have a direct link to the environment, 
taken together they provide a good indication of a country’s environmental sustainability potential. 
Information is not available for all 67 variables for all 122 countries covered (data taken from WEF, 
2001, annex 6). We would expect that in the case of an environmentally committed country 
information on fewer variables are missing and therefore postulate our sixth hypothesis: 
 
H6: Democracies have more variables available in the set of ESI variables than non-democracies. 
 
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
 
Table 2 provides a Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent variables (in the case of 
MEAs only the summary variable is included). The correlation coefficients are all positive as 
expected. This is important since they are after all supposed to proxy the same underlying non-
observable phenomenon, environmental commitment. At the same time, the correlations are nowhere 
near 100%. Anything else would suggest redundancy among the proxy variables. 
 
 
7. The Independent Variables 
Turning to the independent variables, as concerns the democracy variables we use only the Polity 
measure for the estimations reported below. This is in order to save space and because we regard 
this measure to be the one that is theoretically best justified. The original Polity data set provides two 
indices on a 0 to 10 scale, one for the extent of a country’s democratic and the other for its 
autocratic characteristics. Taking the data as coded by Gurr & Jaggers (2000), the democracy 
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scores range from 0 to 10 and the autocracy scores from 0 to –10. Our Polity measure is the sum of 
these two values. We tested the other three measures of democracy in sensitivity analysis and found 
that the results are robust with respect to the measure of democracy employed. The Freedom House 
political rights and civil liberties indices both run on a 1 to 7 scale. We have added up the two indices 
to create a continuous variable ranging from 2 to 14. The governance indicator developed by World 
Bank staff is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of about one, with a 
minimum of about -1.8 and a maximum of about 1.7. Data come from Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido-
Lobatón (1999a,b). Finally, we have taken an index of democratization from Vanhanen (2000) that 
runs from 0 to about 44. 
Besides democracy (our hypothesis to be tested), which other factors would one theoretically 
expect to impact upon the environmental commitment of a country? First, per capita income should 
have a positive impact upon environmental commitment. In economic terms this would mean that 
environmental commitment is a normal good. This need not imply that poor countries care less about 
the environment per se. Rather, because of their poverty they might prioritize issues other than the 
environment. Income per capita is measured as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 
purchasing power parity (PPP) in US$ in 1998, taken from UNDP (2000).15  
We considered including a squared income term as well to allow for a non-linear effect of 
income on environmental commitment. The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature often 
includes such a term finding that environmental outcomes first worsen with rising income until a 
threshold is reached after which they improve with rising incomes. In non-reported sensitivity analysis 
we tried inclusion of squared income. In almost all cases there was no evidence for a non-linear 
relationship so that income squared was not included in the estimations. In certain model 
                                                 
15 For a few countries, the income data stem from years earlier than 1998. The bias is likely to be very small and 
would not have justified taking these countries out of the sample. 
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specifications we use instrumental variables for democracy and income in our three-stage least 
squares estimations. A presentation and discussion of these instrumental variables is contained in 
section 8.2. 
Second, big and “important” countries should be more environmentally committed than small and 
“unimportant” ones. More important countries might show signs of stronger environmental 
commitment not necessarily due to stronger environmental concern per se. Rather, we hypothesize 
here that these countries will find it in their interest to demonstrate environmental commitment, 
particularly with respect to certain proxy variables for commitment, in order to demonstrate their 
importance in world politics, of which the environment represents one part. In other words, 
important countries want to be seen as good citizens and leaders in world environmental affairs. As a 
proxy for “importance” we use population size. This can be justified by the fact that countries with a 
big population often have significant military power and often play a leading role in world political 
matters. This holds true in spite of their often low levels of per capita income – witness such countries 
as Brazil, China, India and Russia. Of course, countries with a relatively small population, but high 
levels of income per capita can also be “important” international actors. However, since we control 
already for income per capita and cannot include both population and total GDP as this would create 
perfect collinearity with income per capita, we decided to use only population size as a proxy for a 
country’s “importance”. Data are taken from World Bank (2001a). 
Besides these general control variables, which are included in the estimations for all dependent 
variables, we also use a number of specific variables for a few dependent variables that control for 
specific interests of countries. For the Kyoto Protocol we use a dummy for member countries of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) given the well known opposition of this 
organization and the countries it represents against multilateral action on curbing greenhouse gas 
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emissions.16 For the Copenhagen Amendment to the Montreal Protocol we use the log of net 
exports (production minus consumption) of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in tons of ozone depleting 
potential averaged over the period 1986 to 1989, with data compiled from UNEP (1999).17 We 
expect this variable to have a positive influence on a country’s willingness to ratify the amendment 
because the same countries that produced CFCs before were also the prime candidates for 
producing substitutes and had therefore an incentive to bring the Montreal Protocol and its 
amendments into force. For the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants the logged 
share of the value of chemical to all exports is used. Chemical exports are taken from UNCTAD 
(2000), general export data from World Bank (2001a).18 With its restrictions on trade in certain 
hazardous chemicals, the Stockholm Convention should affect countries with a higher share of 
chemicals to all exports more than others. However, it is not quite clear a priori whether major 
chemical exporters had more to gain from participating and influencing the treaty process or from 
abstaining and boycotting the negotiations. The logged total number of species per capita existent in a 
country enters the model for the Biosafety Protocol as well as the CITES reporting requirements 
met, with data compiled from WCMC (1994). The idea is that these countries have a greater stake 
in biodiversity and species protection (Biosafety Protocol) and are likely to stand more in the 
spotlight if they fail to meet their reporting requirements under CITES. Finally, we also use 
population density (population divided by land area in square kilometres) for the model in which 
                                                 
16 We also tested variables indicating the vulnerability of countries towards the effects of global warming. 
However, neither tropical location nor a dummy variable for low-lying countries tested significantly. 
17 We also tried absolute latitude as a proxy for vulnerability towards the consequences of ozone layer depletion, 
but it tested insignificantly throughout. 
18 Ideally, we would have used a variable measuring trade in hazardous chemicals only or, better still, in the 
hazardous chemicals covered by the Stockholm Convention. However, data constraints did not allow 
constructing such a variable. 
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percentage of land area under protection status is the dependent variable. This is because a country 
with a high population density will find it much more difficult to score high on this variable. Population 
density data stem from World Bank (2001a). 
These are certainly not the only control variables one could think of in theory. However, in many 
cases it is simply not possible to construct an additional control variable for 150 or so countries. 
Indeed, no control variable could be found for the other dependent variables since they are so 
general that it would be difficult to find specific variables for which we would expect a statistically 
significant impact. Are our estimations severely affected by potential omitted variable bias? We 
believe not. Indeed, in section 8.2 we will use instrumental variables for democracy and income 
demonstrating robustness in our results in the sense that democracy and income remain determinants 
of environmental commitment in the majority of cases. If we assume, not unrealistically, that our 
instrumental variables are uncorrelated with any potentially omitted further control variables, then we 
have established a statistically significant effect of democracy and income on environmental 
commitment that is free from any potential omitted variable bias. Indeed, in applying tests of over-
identification we find evidence that our instruments are not correlated with the error term and 
therefore with any potentially omitted variables. 
 
 
8. Results 
Neumayer (2002a) showed that democracies exhibit stronger environmental commitment. This held 
true for all of the four different measures of democracies presented above. Table 3 replicates the 
results for the Polity measure. Note that for each explanatory variable the reported numbers are 
always in the order of the coefficient, the standard error and the p-value. This order will be the same 
for all following tables. Those p-values, which are statistically significant at the .10 level are in italic, 
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those significant at the .05 level are additionally in bold. The estimation technique used depends on 
the dependent variable and is indicated in the table.19 The statistically significant and positive impact 
of democracy on environmental commitment is discernible in all proxy variables. In accordance with 
expectation, in most cases income and population size are statistically significant and positively 
associated with environmental commitment. The special interest variables are significant with the 
expected sign apart from the case of the Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants. 
 
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
 
In this paper, we extend the analysis of Neumayer (2002a) substantially. We briefly consider 
potential problems with multicollinearity, we check for robustness of the results with respect to 
potential omitted variable bias, we test for the effect of income inequality, we analyze which aspect of 
democracy is the driver behind environmental commitment, we examine whether regime instability is 
detrimental to environmental commitment and we assess whether countries in conflict exhibit weaker 
environmental commitment. Our results are remarkably robust across these various model 
specifications and for different measures of environmental commitment. They are also robust across 
indices of democracy, but, as mentioned already, to save space we present the results from the 
analysis for the Polity variable only. 
 
8.1 Is there an independent effect of democracy on environmental commitment? 
Income and democracy are correlated. This begs the question whether the estimated effect of 
democracy on environmental commitment can truly be attributed to democracy. In other words, 
                                                 
19 Note that the coefficients for probit estimations are transformed probability estimates at the mean of all 
independent variables, not the probit coefficients themselves. 
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does democracy pick up some of the statistically significant effect that might also be accounted for by 
the income variable? Is the effect of democracy spurious or is there an independent effect of 
democracy on environmental commitment? Similar doubts could be raised with respect to the effect 
of income. 
A common answer to this type of problem is to do nothing as long as the estimated coefficients 
are statistically significant, the correlation between the two variables is not very high and the variance 
inflation factor is not above 10 (Kennedy, 1992). The former is certainly the case in our estimations 
as can be seen in Table 3. As concerns the correlation between income and democracy, the 
correlation coefficient is .40, which, whilst highly statistically significant, is still much below values that 
are commonly regarded as problematic (such as .80 or above). The variance inflation factor is hardly 
above 1. Also, we do not detect any of the usual symptoms of strong multicollinearity such as 
unstable parameter estimates in the face of small model modifications. So multicollinearity in itself is 
clearly not an issue here. 
 
8.2 Do our estimations suffer from potential omitted variable bias? 
A much more serious problem is potential omitted variable bias. It is hard to specify even 
theoretically which variables should impact upon a country’s commitment with respect to a certain 
environmental aspect. It is even more difficult to construct actual specific control variables. We have 
tried to include as many theoretically justified control variables as we could. But if there are any other 
potentially omitted variables that are correlated with democracy or income, then omitted variable 
bias could pose problems for our estimations. We have therefore developed a simultaneous equation 
model, in which both income and democracy are endogenized and explained as a function of 
exogenous variables, so-called instrumental variables. If the positive and statistically significant effect 
of democracy on environmental commitment is still discernible in this simultaneous equation model, 
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then we have good reason to believe that it is not due to omitted variable bias. This will hold true as 
long as we believe, not unrealistically, that our instruments are not correlated with any potentially 
omitted variable. Indeed, we test this assumption via tests of over-identifying restrictions. 
The instrumental variables we use are based in the theoretical literature explaining cross-country 
differences in income and democracy and can explain a substantial part of the variation in income and 
democracy in our sample. We use as instruments for democracy the following variables: 
 
· The percentage of Muslim people among the total population. Data are taken from La Porta et 
al. (1999). Huntington (1991: 307) suggests that Islamic doctrine ‘contains elements that may be 
both congenial and uncongenial to democracy’. He argues, however, that on the whole countries 
with a strong Muslim population are less likely to be democratic because Islam ‘rejects any 
distinction between the religious community and the political community’ (ibid.). Such a 
distinction proved necessary for the development of democracy in other countries. 
· A dummy variable for countries with a Confucian tradition encompassing China, North and 
South Korea, Singapore and Vietnam. According to Huntington (1991: 300) classic Chinese 
Confucianism and its derivatives presents a barrier to democratization because it emphasizes ‘the 
group over the individual, authority over liberty, and responsibilities over rights’. 
· A dummy variable for fossil fuel exporters, taken from World Bank (2001b). Ross (2001) 
argues that countries that export fossil fuels are less likely to be democratic. Fossil fuel, 
particularly oil, exporters might be able to dampen calls for democracy with low tax rates and 
high government spending and to install security forces to repress such calls. The dependence on 
fossil fuel exports also could imply a delay of modernization effects where the relative lack of 
jobs in the industrial and service sectors could translate into less demand for democratic reforms. 
29 
· A dummy variable for countries with a Socialist legal tradition, taken from La Porta et al. (1999). 
They argue that ‘socialist law is a clear manifestation of the State’s intent to create institutions to 
maintain its power and extract resources, without much regard for protecting the economic 
interests or the liberties of the population. The goal of socialist law is to keep the Communist 
Party in power, not to protect property or freedom.’ (La Porta et al. 1999: 231). In our source 
countries in transition like the former Communist Central and Eastern European countries are 
coded as having a Socialist legal tradition. The law has changed quite tremendously and is no 
longer socialist in many of these countries. However, the inclusion of these countries can be 
justified by the fact that the legacy of socialism makes it more difficult for these countries to 
achieve democracy all other things equal. 
 
In deriving instruments for income we follow the “geography hypothesis” explanation of cross-
country differences in income levels, which relates such differences to geographic, climatic or 
ecological differences across countries (see, for example, Gallup, Sachs & Mellinger 1999; 
McArthur & Sachs 2001). For example, tropical areas are faced with higher human and agricultural 
disease burdens. Countries with better access to sea coasts and navigable rivers are favored by 
lower transportation and trading costs. We note that there is a competing “institutional hypothesis”, 
which explains such differences with reference to the institutional organization of societies (see, for 
example, Sokoloff & Engerman 2000; Engerman, Haber &Sokoloff 2001; Acemoglu, Johnson & 
Robinson 2001a,b; Easterly 2001). In our view the contest between the two hypotheses is 
unresolved. More importantly, we believe that the major difference between these two competing 
hypothesis is founded in the exact mechanism through which geography affects income, but that both 
hypotheses in the end refer to geographical factors as the source of explaining variation in cross-
country income levels. For example, Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001a) suggest that where 
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European settlers were confronted with high mortality rates in the colonized areas, they were less 
likely to settle and more likely to install extractive institutions. Engerman, Haber & Sokoloff (2001) 
argue that colonies in tropical ecozones were conducive to growing crops such as sugar cane that 
promoted the use of slave labor, creating enormous inequalities and a drag on economic 
development. 
For the purpose of this paper, the exact way in which geography affects income levels does not 
matter so much. We can keep these mechanisms in a kind of black box since our aim is to instrument 
for income with exogenous variables, not to explain the specific causal effects of cross-country 
differences in income levels. Given this, we use the instruments put forward by the “geography 
hypothesis” since they are available for many more countries than the main instrumental variable used 
by the “institutional hypothesis” (European settler mortality in the 17th, 18th and 19th century). As 
instruments for income we use the following variables, (with one exception, all data taken from 
Gallup, Sachs & Mellinger (1999): 
 
· The share of land area in the geographical tropics. The absence of frost days leads to higher 
disease burdens and lower agricultural productivity, which hinders the development of tropical 
countries (Gallup, Sachs & Mellinger 1999; Masters & McMillan 2001). 
· The share of population living within 100 kilometers to a sea border or navigable river. Access to 
sea borders or navigable rivers lowers transportation costs and allows countries to expand their 
trading, thus promoting economic development (Gallup, Sachs & Mellinger 1999). 
· The amount of a country’s hydrocarbon wealth, which fuelled early economic development 
(Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger 1999). 
· A dummy variable for countries with a Socialist legal tradition, taken from La Porta et al. (1999). 
The justification for the inclusion of this variable is the same as given above for its inclusion as an 
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instrument for democracy. Once again, we stick to La Porta et al.’s coding of countries in 
transition as having a Socialist legal tradition. The legacy of socialism makes it more difficult for 
these countries to achieve high income levels all other things equal. 
 
One might wonder whether the instrumental variables we use should be allowed to have a direct 
effect on environmental commitment as well. Of course, we could never allow all of the instrumental 
variables to have a direct effect on environmental commitment as this would lead to a non-identified 
model. However, is there any reason why one or the other of the instrumental variables should have 
a direct effect on environmental commitment in addition to its indirect effect via democracy or 
income? In our view, there is absolutely no reason to presume that any of our instrumental variables 
should have a direct effect on one of our proxy variables for environmental commitment. There is one 
exception. One could speculate that hydrocarbon wealth and being a fuel exporter might have an 
effect on a country’s willingness to sign the Kyoto Protocol. However, since we control for OPEC 
membership we control for the organized form of the countries with the greatest hydrocarbon wealth 
and fuel exports already. We have therefore decided to allow an impact of our instrumental variables 
on environmental commitment only via the variables they instrument for. 
All estimations were undertaken with three-stage least squares (3SLS) in STATA. Three-stage 
least squares involves three steps: First, predicted or instrumented values of the endogenous 
variables are generated, using all exogenous variables in the system. Second, a cross-equation 
covariance matrix is estimated. Third, the equation with the environmental commitment as the 
dependent variable is estimated with generalized least squares using the instrumented variables, other 
exogenous variables as well as the estimated covariance matrix. The estimation technique 3SLS has 
the important advantage over two-stage least squares (2SLS) that it uses the covariance matrix of 
disturbances, which improves the efficiency of estimation leading to smaller standard errors. 
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However, this improvement depends on the consistency of the covariance matrix estimates, since 
with 3SLS the misspecification of one equation affects the estimates in all other equations. In 
sensitivity analysis we have therefore tested the system of equations with 2SLS instead and found no 
substantial changes. 
Three-stage least squares assumes that the dependent variable is continuous. Some of our 
proxies for environmental commitment, however, are binary and not continuous. The signing or 
ratification of an MEA (multilateral environmental agreement), membership in an EIO (environmental 
intergovernmental organization), and the existence of a NCSD (national council on sustainable 
development) are binary choices that reflect commitment to environmental policies. As binary 
choices, these variables are not continuous. In the single equation models we have used probit to 
estimate these models, a maximum likelihood estimation technique. There is no readily available 
maximum likelihood estimation technique that can account for the simultaneous structure accounted 
for in our 3SLS estimations. To provide consistent results across estimations, for both continuous 
and binary dependent variables, we have used the same estimation technique. Applying a linear 
probability model such as 3SLS to a binary dependent variable unfortunately suffers from some 
shortcomings. In particular the errors are dependent on the coefficients. Aldrich and Nelson (1984) 
demonstrate, however, that this is not necessarily a fatal problem. More importantly, we find 
remarkably robust results across all of our estimations, regardless of whether the dependent variable 
is binary or continuous. Given the consistency between the single equation probit estimations and the 
3SLS estimations, we believe our results indicate a clear relationship between democracy and 
environmental commitment. 
 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
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Table 4 presents the results for the estimations of the simultaneous equation model. The top of 
this table shows the estimated coefficients for the equation with the proxy for environmental 
commitment as the dependent variable. As before, the numbers report coefficients, standard errors 
and p-values in that order. The set of coefficients belonging to the equation with logged income as 
the dependent variable follow on the next page. At the bottom of that table are the coefficients with 
democracy as the dependent variable. 
Democracy as measured by the Polity variable works quite well as a predictor of environmental 
commitment. The variable assumes significance in the case of the Stockholm Convention and the 
Biosafety Protocol as well as the aggregate MEA variable. More democratic countries are also 
estimated to participate in more environmental intergovernmental organizations and to have a higher 
share of their land area under protection status. They are more likely to have a National Council on 
Sustainable Development and have less information missing from the Environmental Sustainability 
Index. Besides democracy, we find that richer countries in the majority of instances and more 
populous countries in some instances exhibit stronger environmental commitment in accordance with 
our theoretical expectations. The results on the specific control variables are as before, with the 
exception of population density, which loses significance in 3SLS. 
In summary, we find evidence for an effect of democracy on environmental commitment in 
almost all cases even after endogenizing both income and democracy. But are our exogenous 
variables valid instruments? To test this we had to undertake tests for over-identifying restrictions, 
which effectively tests for whether some of the instruments at least are uncorrelated with the 
structural error and therefore with any potentially omitted variable. Since STATA does not have a 
routine to test for over-identifying restrictions after 3SLS, estimations were repeated for the Polity 
democracy variable in EViews with a General Methods of Moments estimator and consecutive tests 
for over-identifying restrictions. In the vast majority of cases, the null of valid restrictions failed to 
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become rejected. In a few instances the test statistic assumed marginal significance. However, with 
one exception, in all of these cases employing one of the other democracy variables lead to a 
successful passing of the test of over-identifying restrictions whilst also having a significant effect on 
environmental commitment. We are therefore confident that the exogenous variables we use are valid 
instruments for income and democracy. The one exception is for the dependent variable “Number of 
environmental intergovernmental organizations in which a country participates”. For this variable we 
cannot be confident that the instruments are valid and the model is correctly specified (Davidson & 
Mackinnon 1993). 
 
8.3 The effect of income inequality on environmental commitment 
As a next step, we wanted to analyze the effect of income inequality on environmental commitment, 
using the ratio of the income share of the highest 10 per cent of households to the lowest 20 per cent 
as our variable. Data are taken from World Bank (2001a) and Encyclopedia Britannica (2001). 
Income inequality could have an effect on environmental commitment in two ways. First, there could 
be a direct effect. Boyce (1994) argues that greater levels of income inequality lead to more 
environmental degradation, whereas Scruggs (1998) suggests the opposite might be the case.20 
Torras & Boyce (1998) find some tentative evidence that income inequality is associated with worse 
environmental outcomes in terms of air and water pollution, Scruggs (1998) finds some evidence that 
points in the opposite direction. We therefore tested whether income inequality has any impact on 
environmental commitment. Second, income inequality could have an effect on environmental 
commitment through either democracy or income. Some argue that democracy and inequality are 
intrinsically linked. Vanhanen (1990; 1997; 2002) suggests that democratization is rooted in 
conditions in which power resources have become so widely distributed that a single group is no 
                                                 
20 The detailed arguments are quite complex and cannot be dealt with here. 
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longer able to suppress its competitors or to maintain its hegemony. According to this perspective, a 
country’s institutional composition stems from patterns of resource distribution, which in turn are a 
product of nature and history. Similarly, some economists argue that income inequality causes 
underdevelopment (Easterly 2001). Income inequality can therefore have a negative effect on 
environmental commitment via its negative effect on a country’s level of democracy and income. 
To test these various potential effects of income inequality we estimated several model 
specifications. We analyzed the effect of inequality as an exogenous variable, as an instrumental 
variable for both democracy and income, as an instrumental variable for income alone, as a fully 
endogenized variable with direct effects on environmental commitment, and as a fully endogenized 
variable with direct effects on environmental commitment as well as indirect effects, using inequality 
as one of the explanatory variables for democracy and income. This last model is the most general 
one, allowing inequality to affect environmental commitment through all ways possible. 
In endogenizing inequality we have chosen to use almost the same instrumental variables as 
Easterly (2001). These instruments are dummy variables indicating whether a country produces any 
positive amount of the following commodities: bananas, coffee, maize, millet, rice, sugarcane, wheat, 
copper, silver and rubber, respectively. Data are taken from FAO (2002). In addition, we use the 
same dummy for whether a country is a fossil fuel exporter from World Bank (2001b) we also use 
as an instrument for democracy. The idea behind these instruments is that natural conditions 
favorable for the harvest of certain crops and the extraction of certain natural resources were also 
historically favorable for promoting high inequality in these countries vice versa for certain other 
crops. For more detail, see Easterly (2001) and the references cited therein. 
 
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
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Table 5 presents results for the model that endogenizes inequality and allows for an effect on 
environmental commitment both directly and via democracy and income. The structure of this table is 
the same as for table 4. The principal problem with these estimations is that the cross-national 
coverage of measures of inequality are spotty. Including income inequality not only reduces our 
sample size from a range of 111-139 depending on the dependent variable to 105-123 observations. 
More importantly, it also leads to a biased sample since income inequality data are mainly missing for 
non-democratic countries.21 Furthermore, the cross-country comparability of income inequality data 
is highly questionable and measurement errors are rampant (Atkinson and Brandolini 2001). Note 
that in using instrumental variables for income inequality, we hope to have reduced problems with 
measurement error somewhat if we assume, not unrealistically, that our instruments are not correlated 
with the measurement error. 
Having noted the problems with the income inequality variable, we nevertheless present results in 
table 5. Income inequality has a negative indirect effect on environmental commitment via its 
detrimental effect on democracy in accordance with Vanhanen (1990; 1997; 2000). Contrary to 
Easterly (2001), however, we do not find a detrimental effect of inequality on income. In some 
cases, inequality is estimated to also have a direct effect on environmental commitment. However, 
the direction of the effect is inconsistent across our range of proxy variables for environmental 
commitment. On the one hand, inequality is estimated to have a positive effect on a country’s 
willingness to sign or ratify more multilateral environmental agreements and to participate in 
environmental intergovernmental organizations. On the other hand, inequality is estimated to have a 
                                                 
21 We could not establish inequality data for the following countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bahrain, 
Belize, Bhutan, Cameroon, Comoros, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Macedonia, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Suriname, 
Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro). 
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negative effect on a country’s environmental commitment in terms of CITES reporting requirements 
met, the percentage of land area under protection status and the availability of environmentally 
relevant information. Income remains statistically significant in the majority of cases very similar to the 
results reported in Table 4, where income inequality was not included. Democracy does not fare 
quite as well. It is estimated to have a positive effect on participation in environmental 
intergovernmental organizations, land protection and availability of environmentally relevant 
information. We would like to stress, however, that these results need to be treated with great care, 
particularly because the sample is biased due to the fact that income inequality data are missing 
mainly for non-democracies. 
 
8.4 Which aspects of democracy are the most important drivers of environmental 
commitment? 
Democracy is a complex concept and the variables we use combine various conceptually distinct 
information into one single aggregate index. We examined which aspects of the aggregate democracy 
variable are the most important drivers of environmental commitment. We utilized a decomposition of 
two of our aggregate indices of democracy, namely political participation, executive constraints 
and executive recruitment. 
Contrary to executive recruitment and executive constraints, the political participation 
measure was not taken directly from the Polity data set. This is because there are several problems 
with the Polity participation index. First, the components of the index are rather subjective. Second, 
the criterion for coding a polity as having regulated and competitive participation ignores aspects of 
enfranchisement that to some extent serve to define modern democracy. For instance, a polity that 
prohibits women, ethnic minorities, or non-property owners from voting is often regarded as having 
the same level of participation as a polity that grants voting rights to all groups. Third, the Polity 
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coding scheme classifies a large share of the polities as factional systems. Indeed, up to 40% of all 
polities fit this description. In polities with ‘factional’ participation, there is a ‘pattern of intense, often 
violent competition between ‘in’ and ‘out’ factions’, each having a fragile grasp of power  (Gurr, 
1974: 1486). The problem is that factionalism does not address the institutional composition of a 
country, but rather an outcome of an institutional arrangement. 
Instead of taking over the data from the Polity participation index, we have therefore taken our 
data on participation from Gates et al. (2001). These authors have transformed the raw participation 
measures composing an aspect of the Polyarchy data set (Vanhanen 2000). Gates et al. (2001) 
undertake two sorts of transformations: First, they modify Vanhanen’s participation index if the 
percent of the valid votes won by all parties except the plurality winner or winning electoral alliance is 
less than 30%. This transformation is useful for parsing out polities that have had very high 
participation in elections in which there were no real alternatives (e.g., the former communist states). 
If there is no real choice, the election does not really play a role in the selection of the executive. 
Second, Gates et al. (2001) take the natural logarithm of Vanhanen’s participation index before they 
multiply it with his competition measure. This is in order to impose a marginally decreasing effect of 
participation. The effect of a change from 5% to 15% of the population voting is a much more 
significant shift than is a change from 45% to 55%. After these transformations were undertaken, the 
final participation measure then ranges between 0 and 4.5, where the higher number indicates greater 
levels of participation. All observations with 0% participation were given an additional 0.001% in 
order to avoid mathematically undefined terms. 
Table 6 reports our estimation results entering the three dimensions of democracy in lieu of the 
aggregate Polity variable. In most cases participation is the variable that tests significantly. What this 
means is that the strength of environmental commitment is likely to depend most on the fundamental 
aspect of democracy, which in our view is participation. 
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< Insert Table 6 about here > 
 
8.5 Is regime instability detrimental to environmental commitment? 
A number of studies regarding the effects of democracy distinguish between the level and stability 
of democracy.22 Thus, we wanted to find out whether countries that suffer from regime instability 
exhibit less environmental commitment. To test this, we constructed a variable measuring the number 
of times the political regime within a country has changed since 1960 or since independence if a 
country achieved independence after 1960 (data on independence taken from the Correlates of War 
dataset (Singer & Small 1994)). Regime change is defined as any change in indicators that results in 
a movement from one category in the Executive dimension, a change of at least two units in the 
Constraints dimension, or a movement in the Participation dimension of more than 0.5 in either 
direction from the original level (these three dimensions follow from Gurr’s conceptualization of the 
authority patterns of a political system as introduced above). If a political system experiences two 
consecutive one-unit changes in Constraints, we define the second of these as a polity change. The 
creation or dissolution of states is also defined as a polity change. Finally, we define a regime as a 
political system between two polity changes. Data are taken from Gates et al. (2001). 
Interestingly, controlling for the current regime type, we do not find a statistically significant 
negative impact of regime instability on environmental commitment (results not reported). This could 
be due to measurement problems. Gates et al.’s (2001) definition of political change is extremely 
sensitive to political change. Minor twitches in the political system are regarded to be signs of 
political instability. Unfortunately they do not make a distinction between minor and significant 
                                                 
22  See Hegre, et al. (2001) who examine both level and stability with regard to the onset of civil war. 
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political changes. The alternative explanation is that political instability simply has no statistically 
significant relationship with environmental commitment. 
 
8.6 Do countries in conflict exhibit weaker environmental commitment? 
Given the recent interest in the relationship between conflict and the environment, we wanted to find 
out whether countries in conflict exhibit weaker environmental commitment. Conflict could have a 
negative impact on environmental commitment for a number of reasons. Perhaps the most important 
one is that during conflict and in its aftermath attention and priority is likely to shift towards the 
conflict itself and dealing with the damages it inflicts upon society and economy. Of course, 
environmental damage caused by conflicts might induce governments to exhibit greater environmental 
commitment in order to mitigate the damages, but we would expect this contrary effect to be of 
second order relevance. To test the potential negative aggregate effect of conflict on environmental 
commitment, we constructed three dummy variables: One for whether a country was in conflict of 
small size in the years 1995 to 2000, another one for whether a country was in conflict of large size 
during the same time period. The third dummy variable is for large civil conflicts. Small conflict is 
defined as any type of armed conflict resulting in more than 25 casualties in any one year. The 
threshold is much higher for large conflicts, which require more than 1,000 battle deaths in a single 
year to qualify. It is clear that due to the higher threshold, the dummy for large conflicts is nested 
within the dummy for small conflicts. In addition, we constructed three continuous variables 
measuring the number of small and large conflict years as well as large civil conflict years a country 
experienced during the 1990s. All these data were taken from Gleditsch et al. (2001). In the vast 
majority of cases we do not find a statistically significant negative effect of conflict experience on 
environmental commitment (results not reported). This holds true independent of whether we enter 
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either the dummy or continuous variables in isolation or in combination and holds true for both small 
and large conflicts as well as for the subset of large civil conflicts. 
 
 
9. Conclusions 
Taken together, the results reported in the last section provide strong evidence in favor of our 
hypothesis that democracies exhibit stronger environmental commitment than non-democracies. This 
result appears to be relatively robust with respect to our different proxy variables of environmental 
commitment. For the great majority of these proxies the democracy variable not only has the 
expected sign, but it is also statistically significant. 
We considered whether the correlation between income and democracy is likely to create 
problems for our estimations. However, we believe that the correlation is too small to create serious 
problems. In other words, there is no reason to presume that the estimated positive effect of 
democracy simply picks up an effect that might as well be accounted for by income. 
To investigate whether the effects of democracy and income on environmental commitment 
suffer from omitted variable bias, we used three-stage least squares estimations for a simultaneous 
equations model. We found no evidence that our results are triggered by omitted variable bias. We 
are therefore confident that both income and, in particular, democracy truly have a statistically 
significant impact on environmental commitment. 
Both income and democracy have an important positive and synergistic effect on environmental 
commitment in most cases. Figure 1 shows this nicely for the proxy variable “Percentage of land area 
under protection status”. It uses the estimated coefficients from table 3, holding population size and 
population density at their sample mean and defining low income and democracy as one standard 
deviation below the sample mean, high income and democracy as one standard deviation above the 
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mean. Countries with low income and low democracy have put the lowest percentage of their land 
area under protection status. The situation improves substantially if income rises to high level, even 
more so if, instead, democracy rises to high level. However, a truly outstanding level of 
environmental commitment is only estimated for a country with both high income and high 
democracy. 
 
< Insert Figure 1 about here > 
 
We also examined the effect of inequality on environmental commitment. Inequality has a 
negative effect on environmental commitment via its negative effect on democracy. In some cases, 
inequality was also estimated to have a direct effect on environmental commitment. However, the 
direction of the effect is inconsistent across our range of proxy variables and no definite conclusions 
can therefore be drawn on the direct effect of inequality on environmental commitment. Our 
estimated results also have to be treated with care because the sample size becomes smaller and the 
sample becomes biased if income inequality is included. Even then, democracy remains a significant 
positive factor in the case of three proxy variables for environmental commitment. 
Conflict is known to take priority and attention away from “soft” issues such as the environment 
at the same time as it inflicts environmental destruction upon society. Also, recently environmental 
issues have gained increased attention more generally in the conflict literature (Diehl & Gleditsch, 
2001). Therefore, we were interested in finding out whether conflict had an effect on a country’s 
environmental commitment, which on aggregate we would expect to be a negative one. We find no 
evidence for such an effect. Whatever negative impact conflict experience might have on a country, it 
does not translate into any less environmental commitment, at least not as measured by our proxy 
variables. 
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Political participation is the most important aspect of democracy that accounts for environmental 
commitment. The more exclusionary the political system, the less likely it will exhibit environmental 
commitment. At least with regard to the environment, getting more people involved in the political 
process is better than other types of political reforms. Other dimensions of political authority, such as 
executive recruitment and executive constraints play a lesser role with respect to environmental 
commitment. Similarly, political instability is not associated with environmental commitment. The type 
of political system is important, but not the frequency of changes in the system. 
Democracies clearly suffer from deficiencies and even failures with respect to environmental 
commitment as well. For example, future generations are affected by environmental degradation, but 
cannot express their preferences in the political market place of the present. Environmental 
degradation that cuts across national boundaries may be hard to counteract without the existence of 
a transnational political authority. Environmental degradation also cuts across administrative 
boundaries within nation-states, which renders policies successfully addressing these problems more 
difficult (Doeleman 1997). But the point is that non-democracies equally suffer from these 
deficiencies, if not more. While democracy is less than perfect, there is no better alternative. 
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Table 1. Pearson correlation matrix for democracy variables (N = 159). 
 
 FREE POLIT GOV VAN 
FREE 1.00    
POLIT .92 1.00   
GOV .94 .83 1.00  
VAN .81 .77 .81 1.00 
 
FREE: Joint index of Freedom House political rights and civil liberties variables. 
POLIT: Polity index of democracy minus autocracy. 
GOV: World Bank Governance variable. 
VAN: Vanhanen’s index of democracy. 
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Table 2. Pearson correlation matrix for dependent variables (N = 101). 
 
 MEAs # env. IO cites landprot. NCSD ESI 
MEAs 1.00      
# env. IO .49 1.00     
cites .25 .43 1.00    
landprot. .23 .19 .32 1.00   
NCSD .21 .23 .11 .16 1.00  
ESI .54 .64 .51 .17 .33 1.00 
 
MEAs: Sum of Multilateral Environmental Agreements a country has signed/ratified (0 to 4). 
# env. IO: Number of environmental inter-governmental organizations a country participates in. 
Cites:  Percentage of reporting requirements met of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Fauna and Flora. 
Landprot.: Percentage of land area under protection status. 
NCSD: Dummy for the existence of a National Council on Sustainable Development. 
ESI: Number of environmentally relevant variables available. 
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Table 3. Single equation analysis of environmental commitment. 
 
 
Kyoto Copenhag Stockholm Biosafety MEAs # env. IO Cites Landprot. NCSD ESI
lnGDP 0.231 0.174 0.090 -0.010 0.381 2.993 8.632 1.031 0.073 2.486
0.047 0.040 0.045 0.040 0.079 0.451 2.384 0.564 0.030 0.256
0.000 0.000 0.045 0.800 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.016 0.000
polity 0.017 0.010 0.020 0.026 0.081 0.205 1.252 0.275 0.016 0.244
0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.014 0.073 0.543 0.099 0.005 0.052
0.030 0.092 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.023 0.006 0.001 0.000
lnPOP 0.071 0.020 0.086 0.097 0.155 2.089 7.382 0.108 0.073 1.623
0.034 0.030 0.038 0.036 0.065 0.295 2.417 0.367 0.023 0.166
0.038 0.506 0.021 0.008 0.018 0.000 0.003 0.768 0.001 0.000
opec 0.106
-2.450
0.072
lnCFCexport 0.004
0.002
0.045
lnCHEMexp -0.079
0.056
0.156
lnSPECIESpc 0.078 4.971
0.029 2.461
0.007 0.046
popdensity -0.008
0.004
0.034
constant -46.662 -87.074 -2.756 5.929
6.072 36.693 7.178 3.622
0.000 0.019 0.702 0.104
Pseudo R2 0.285 0.233 0.127 0.152 0.162 0.218
R-squared 0.529 0.358 0.118 0.693
N 153 153 153 153 153 121 115 141 153 122
Est. technique Probit Probit Probit Probit Ord. Probit OLS OLS OLS Probit OLS
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Table 4. Three-stage least squares analysis of environmental commitment. 
 
 
Kyoto Copenhag Stockholm Biosafety MEAs # env. IO Cites Landprot. NCSD ESI
lnGDP 0.186 0.147 0.105 -0.019 0.294 2.480 7.985 -0.174 0.001 2.340
0.053 0.045 0.063 0.054 0.117 0.575 3.410 0.863 0.042 0.345
0.000 0.001 0.098 0.724 0.012 0.000 0.019 0.841 0.977 0.000
polity 0.013 0.005 0.020 0.021 0.081 0.452 1.116 0.426 0.018 0.273
0.011 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.022 0.122 0.749 0.164 0.008 0.072
0.235 0.546 0.028 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.136 0.010 0.022 0.000
lnPOP 0.043 0.001 0.078 0.077 0.125 2.125 5.837 0.037 0.079 1.650
0.026 0.025 0.043 0.031 0.063 0.309 2.170 0.449 0.022 0.189
0.094 0.956 0.073 0.013 0.046 0.000 0.007 0.934 0.000 0.000
opec -0.425
0.172
0.014
lnCFCexport 0.006
0.002
0.007
lnCHEMexp -0.080
0.060
0.187
lnSPECIESpc 0.083 4.371
0.029 2.560
0.004 0.088
popdensity -0.004
0.005
0.439
constant -1.736 -0.504 -1.409 0.138 -2.218 -43.971 -59.385 7.536 -0.562 6.570
0.603 0.568 1.036 0.615 1.374 6.880 36.425 9.751 0.494 4.152
0.004 0.375 0.174 0.822 0.106 0.000 0.103 0.440 0.255 0.114
p-value Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.000
# observations 139 139 139 139 139 118 111 135 139 118
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Table 4 (continued). 
 
lnGDP lnGDP lnGDP lnGDP lnGDP lnGDP lnGDP lnGDP lnGDP lnGDP
% land tropics -1.470 -1.472 -1.473 -1.470 -1.473 -1.531 -1.700 -1.502 -1.457 -1.527
0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.156 0.155 0.142 0.143 0.156
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
% pop 100km 1.235 1.232 1.239 1.233 1.217 1.214 1.200 1.195 1.195 1.218
0.178 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.186 0.193 0.177 0.176 0.186
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
hydrocarbon 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.025 0.040 0.033 0.039 0.026
0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015
0.008 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.101 0.010 0.019 0.004 0.090
socialist legacy -0.360 -0.369 -0.372 -0.365 -0.366 -0.379 -0.296 -0.393 -0.369 -0.417
0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.185 0.214 0.163 0.165 0.185
0.032 0.027 0.026 0.029 0.029 0.041 0.167 0.016 0.025 0.024
constant 8.516 8.521 8.518 8.517 8.525 8.616 8.705 8.545 8.526 8.619
0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.153 0.155 0.141 0.142 0.152
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Polity Polity Polity Polity Polity Polity Polity Polity Polity Polity
% muslim -0.116 -0.117 -0.116 -0.116 -0.116 -0.115 -0.113 -0.115 -0.116 -0.120
0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.012
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
confucianism -6.379 -6.379 -6.365 -6.357 -6.308 -8.118 -6.193 -6.449 -6.388 -7.280
2.471 2.468 2.473 2.473 2.473 2.163 2.402 2.435 2.473 2.264
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.000 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.001
fuelexporter -3.523 -3.366 -3.435 -3.424 -3.420 -3.727 -4.288 -3.278 -3.443 -3.895
0.944 0.943 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.913 0.951 0.945 0.944 0.942
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
socialist legacy -3.218 -2.987 -3.096 -3.077 -3.112 -3.853 -4.489 -3.314 -3.095 -2.531
1.000 0.999 1.001 1.001 1.001 0.958 1.322 0.998 1.001 1.010
0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.012
constant 7.877 7.810 7.840 7.837 7.836 8.827 8.484 7.825 7.844 8.683
0.630 0.630 0.631 0.631 0.631 0.604 0.647 0.635 0.631 0.610
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 5. Three-stage least squares analysis of environmental commitment with income inequality 
included. 
Kyoto Copenhag Stockholm Biosafety MEAs # env. IO Cites Landprot. NCSD ESI
lnGDP 0.343 0.221 0.254 0.091 0.847 2.908 5.738 -1.805 0.034 2.396
0.069 0.062 0.087 0.075 0.161 0.699 3.706 1.198 0.054 0.412
0.000 0.000 0.004 0.224 0.000 0.000 0.122 0.132 0.524 0.000
polity -0.017 -0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.012 0.448 0.576 0.731 0.011 0.217
0.014 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.030 0.150 0.778 0.232 0.010 0.087
0.204 0.922 0.971 0.919 0.698 0.003 0.459 0.002 0.280 0.013
lnPOP 0.021 -0.017 0.099 0.053 0.052 1.986 7.710 -0.068 0.057 1.554
0.030 0.027 0.047 0.035 0.069 0.320 2.202 0.510 0.023 0.192
0.495 0.515 0.035 0.128 0.446 0.000 0.000 0.894 0.013 0.000
inequality 0.026 0.017 0.021 0.024 0.109 0.314 -3.495 -0.526 -0.006 -0.181
0.016 0.014 0.016 0.022 0.037 0.185 1.216 0.290 0.012 0.104
0.105 0.226 0.178 0.284 0.003 0.089 0.004 0.070 0.600 0.083
opec -0.388
0.200
0.053
lnCFCexport 0.006
0.003
0.031
lnCHEMexp -0.127
0.062
0.040
lnSPECIESpc 0.071 9.555
0.048 3.414
0.138 0.005
popdensity -0.007
0.006
0.198
constant 4.897 5.177 5.352 5.244 5.332 4.064 4.812 5.435 5.377 3.632
1.452 1.562 1.512 1.543 1.423 1.473 1.735 1.501 1.518 1.482
0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.014
p-value Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.002 0.000
# observations 123 123 123 123 123 109 105 120 123 109
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Table 5 (continued). 
 
lnGDP lnGDP lnGDP lnGDP lnGDP lnGDP lnGDP lnGDP lnGDP lnGDP
% land tropics -1.492 -1.364 -1.507 -1.527 -1.471 -1.697 -1.632 -1.600 -1.491 -1.694
0.185 0.182 0.186 0.185 0.185 0.210 0.206 0.181 0.186 0.210
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
% pop 100km 1.272 1.258 1.256 1.249 1.240 1.352 1.225 1.227 1.252 1.347
0.190 0.191 0.191 0.191 0.189 0.201 0.205 0.191 0.190 0.201
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
hydrocarbon 0.032 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.033 0.027 0.032 0.028
0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.016
0.043 0.082 0.080 0.063 0.073 0.087 0.054 0.077 0.041 0.086
socialist legacy -0.288 -0.403 -0.380 -0.363 -0.391 -0.240 -0.294 -0.334 -0.331 -0.285
0.194 0.193 0.195 0.195 0.194 0.214 0.239 0.192 0.194 0.214
0.138 0.037 0.051 0.062 0.044 0.262 0.219 0.081 0.088 0.182
inequality -0.010 -0.046 -0.011 -0.008 -0.022 0.041 -0.013 0.003 -0.013 0.038
0.032 0.030 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.036 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.036
0.752 0.121 0.722 0.788 0.500 0.247 0.682 0.929 0.675 0.288
constant 8.595 8.811 8.640 8.628 8.700 8.362 8.741 8.580 8.635 8.393
0.240 0.234 0.242 0.239 0.242 0.259 0.231 0.239 0.242 0.259
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Polity Polity Polity Polity Polity Polity Polity Polity Polity Polity
% muslim -0.107 -0.110 -0.111 -0.112 -0.113 -0.105 -0.109 -0.113 -0.112 -0.114
0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
confucianism -5.959 -6.503 -6.584 -6.524 -6.586 -8.246 -6.547 -6.147 -6.767 -7.259
2.176 2.239 2.269 2.257 2.218 1.986 2.218 2.199 2.254 2.083
0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.000
fuelexporter -2.655 -2.380 -2.375 -2.657 -2.277 -2.304 -3.434 -2.264 -2.491 -2.742
1.127 1.069 1.128 1.083 1.129 1.011 1.024 1.137 1.127 1.085
0.018 0.026 0.035 0.014 0.044 0.023 0.001 0.046 0.027 0.011
socialist legacy -6.821 -5.522 -5.916 -5.475 -5.564 -5.916 -5.259 -6.425 -5.808 -4.633
1.115 1.124 1.153 1.137 1.135 1.058 1.372 1.133 1.147 1.118
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
inequality -0.838 -0.667 -0.793 -0.669 -0.784 -0.620 -0.458 -0.840 -0.772 -0.503
0.170 0.159 0.171 0.164 0.171 0.171 0.152 0.173 0.172 0.175
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.004
constant 14.339 12.903 13.874 13.023 13.743 12.996 11.826 14.220 13.751 12.219
1.375 1.303 1.384 1.334 1.380 1.258 1.232 1.385 1.386 1.281
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 5 (continued). 
 
 
Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality
bananas -1.918 -1.515 -1.284 -2.069 -1.610 0.273 -1.452 -1.228 -1.372 0.009
1.105 1.208 1.171 1.184 1.063 1.134 1.259 1.142 1.180 1.145
0.083 0.210 0.273 0.081 0.130 0.810 0.249 0.282 0.245 0.994
coffee 3.072 2.656 2.569 3.412 2.974 0.928 3.292 2.692 2.745 1.399
1.247 1.352 1.314 1.322 1.201 1.219 1.421 1.311 1.323 1.233
0.014 0.049 0.051 0.010 0.013 0.447 0.020 0.040 0.038 0.257
maize 1.316 1.135 1.377 1.587 1.322 0.408 0.145 0.916 1.131 1.340
1.369 1.504 1.454 1.481 1.319 1.428 1.714 1.424 1.464 1.442
0.336 0.451 0.344 0.284 0.316 0.775 0.932 0.520 0.440 0.353
millet -1.499 -0.863 -0.781 -0.624 -0.770 -1.808 -1.182 -0.379 -0.888 -1.760
0.868 0.949 0.918 0.930 0.842 0.886 1.099 0.910 0.923 0.892
0.084 0.363 0.395 0.502 0.360 0.041 0.282 0.677 0.336 0.048
rice -0.303 -0.325 -0.700 -0.942 -0.943 0.178 2.543 -0.479 -0.550 -0.073
1.148 1.264 1.222 1.233 1.103 1.166 1.570 1.230 1.230 1.178
0.792 0.797 0.567 0.445 0.392 0.879 0.105 0.697 0.655 0.950
sugarcane 2.755 3.447 2.703 3.054 2.836 2.900 1.836 2.422 2.857 2.813
1.340 1.465 1.420 1.435 1.297 1.352 1.636 1.399 1.428 1.365
0.040 0.019 0.057 0.033 0.029 0.032 0.262 0.083 0.045 0.039
wheat -0.972 -1.550 -1.603 -1.355 -1.302 -0.300 -1.576 -1.641 -1.550 -0.591
1.028 1.123 1.088 1.099 0.995 1.066 1.196 1.074 1.094 1.075
0.344 0.168 0.141 0.218 0.190 0.779 0.188 0.127 0.157 0.582
copper -0.960 -0.449 -0.954 -1.136 -0.790 -0.725 -0.235 -0.721 -0.765 -0.602
1.120 1.238 1.195 1.207 1.077 1.118 1.426 1.164 1.203 1.128
0.391 0.717 0.425 0.346 0.463 0.516 0.869 0.536 0.525 0.594
silver 1.508 0.536 1.327 1.394 1.073 1.241 0.701 1.568 1.199 1.352
1.175 1.277 1.234 1.253 1.140 1.152 1.469 1.209 1.241 1.161
0.199 0.675 0.282 0.266 0.347 0.281 0.633 0.195 0.334 0.244
rubber -0.829 -1.563 -1.042 -1.731 -1.312 -0.612 -1.355 -1.238 -1.293 -0.686
1.157 1.268 1.227 1.242 1.119 1.212 1.344 1.198 1.234 1.222
0.473 0.218 0.396 0.164 0.241 0.614 0.313 0.301 0.295 0.575
fuelexporter 1.453 1.015 1.153 0.646 1.203 2.412 0.444 0.996 1.175 2.098
1.155 1.180 1.173 1.158 1.098 1.037 1.193 1.186 1.185 1.062
0.208 0.390 0.325 0.577 0.273 0.020 0.710 0.401 0.322 0.048
constant 32.840 32.974 32.912 33.378 32.909 33.235 33.343 32.749 32.268 32.758
3.184 3.179 3.208 3.149 3.192 3.530 4.081 3.249 3.172 3.498
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000
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Table 6. Single equation estimations of environmental commitment with disaggregated democracy 
variables. 
kyoto Copenhag Stockholm Biosafe MEAs
lnGDP 0.247 0.153 0.081 -0.011 0.356
0.052 0.040 0.049 0.043 0.086
0.000 0.000 0.094 0.806 0.000
executive constraints 0.026 -0.001 0.010 0.045 0.088
0.031 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.062
0.409 0.981 0.737 0.135 0.151
executive recruitment -0.009 -0.002 0.011 -0.041 -0.030
0.043 0.039 0.042 0.046 0.092
0.844 0.962 0.794 0.369 0.748
participation 0.034 0.061 0.088 0.078 0.277
0.045 0.038 0.036 0.040 0.085
0.446 0.109 0.015 0.050 0.001
lnPOP 0.079 0.027 0.078 0.108 0.166
0.035 0.030 0.038 0.035 0.066
0.022 0.372 0.040 0.003 0.011
opec 0.093
-2.640
0.066
lnCFCexport 0.003
0.002
0.152
lnCHEMexp -0.067
0.056
0.228
lnSPECIESpc 0.087
0.028
0.002
Combined p-value
democracy variables 0.3912 0.1578 0.0019 0.0019 0.0000
Pseudo R-squared 0.2796 0.2198 0.136 0.1491 0.1569
# observations 151 151 151 151 151
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Table 6 (continued). 
 
# env. IOs Cites Landprot. NCSD ESI
lnGDP 3.026 7.377 0.882 0.075 2.436
0.501 2.449 0.633 0.032 0.287
0.000 0.003 0.165 0.019 0.000
executive constraints -0.072 -0.039 0.406 0.026 0.491
0.296 1.343 0.351 0.022 0.162
0.809 0.977 0.249 0.232 0.003
executive recruitment 0.747 0.419 0.546 -0.025 0.052
0.355 2.261 0.511 0.033 0.222
0.038 0.853 0.287 0.457 0.816
participation 0.421 5.951 0.234 0.048 0.381
0.462 2.693 0.449 0.028 0.298
0.364 0.029 0.603 0.089 0.204
lnPOP 1.971 7.393 0.047 0.079 1.690
0.295 2.364 0.393 0.023 0.176
0.000 0.002 0.905 0.001 0.000
lnSPECIESpc 5.114
2.335
0.031
population density -0.008
0.004
0.037
constant -47.292 -87.874 -3.650 2.561
5.997 33.937 7.718 3.700
0.000 0.011 0.637 0.490
Combined p-value
democracy variables 0.058 0.1181 0.1629 0.0114 0.0007
R-squared 0.527 0.3404 0.1021 0.6846
Pseudo R-squared 0.2246
# observations 120 114 139 151 121
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Figure 1. The effects of income and democracy on land protection. 
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